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WHITHER OR WITHER TAX IMMUNITIES?
D. J.

FARAGE

Three recent Supreme Court decisions, bearing upon the constitutional validity of various state taxing measures, bid fair to extend the permissible*scope of
the state taxing power and demonstrate a judicial attitude intent upon a repudiation of many artificial immunities evolved by the Court in previous decisions to
curb the exercise of the states' power of taxation.
Foremost, perhaps, in interest and significance among the tax decisions
handed down at the present term of Court is Atlantic Refining Company v. Commonwealth of Virginia.' There a Virginia statute imposed upon every foreign
corporation seeking authority to do local business within the state, a license fee
measured by the corporation's authorized capital stock. The Atlantic Refining
company, seeking to enter the state for the first time to carry on local business, paid
the fee under protest and sought to recover back the amount paid as having been
unconstitutionally exacted. Chief Justice Hughes did not participate in the decision. The other members of the Court unanimously upheld the fee as valid.
That the privilege of admission into the state to do local business was a
proper subject for the exaction was conceded by the taxpayer. What was controverted was the legality of measuring the amount of the fee by the authorized
capital stock of the company, most of whose property was situated elsewhere than
in Virginia. Invoking the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the company
argued, inter alia, that such a measure was unreasonable and violated due process
in that it sought to reach property outside the state. This the cour denied, stating
that authorized capital stock does not necessarily have any relation to the amount
of property owned by the corporation.
No doubt, the relation between authorized capital stock and a corporation's
property is more remote than the relation between issued capital stock and the
corporation's property. The amount of a company's authorized capital stock represents the permissible limits of the company's growth, which may or may not
have been fully attained. Nevertheless, taxes measured by authorized capital
stock have often been declared invalid by the Supreme Court or the theory that
such a measure constitutes an unconstitutional condition when imposed upon the
foreign corporation.2 The invalidity of such a measure might be explained on the
*Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
158 S. Ct. 75 (1937).
2
Cudahy Packing Company v. Hinkle, 278 U. S. 460 (1929) ; and see Court's note 5 in the
principal case at page 80 for other cases.
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theory that since authorized capital stock represents the permissible limits of the
corporation's expansion, and since the privilege to grow is conferred by the state
of incorporation, and not by the states wherein business may be carried on, the
latter have no logical reason justifying their use of authorized capital stock as a
tax measure.
Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court, when faced with this line of cases,
distinguished them on the ground that in "each of those cases, the corporation
had, before the exaction held unconstitutional, entered the State with its permission to do local business and pursuant to that permission had acquired property and made other expenditures." 8 Earlier in the decision the Justice also said,
"Unlike the cases in which the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been
applied, the condition here questioned does not govern the corporation's conduct
4
after admission."
It is submitted thab this case is the first definitely to restrict the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions to regulations imposed subsequent to the admission
of a foreign corporation. It is true that the cases cited by the court in which the
tax was thus measured, appear to have involved conditions subsequent. However,
no stress appears to have been placed by the court in any of these cases upon the
fact that the condition was then imposed. Indeed, in many cases, the opinions do
not indicate at all whether the condition was imposed before or after admission.
The only definite suggestion of the possible distinction between antecedent and
subsequent conditions which appears ever to have been made previously, is in a
dictum in Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Harding,5 a case which did not
involve any attempt to use authorized capital stock as a tax measure.
Moreover, there is at least one decision which appears definitely to apply the
theory of unconstitutional conditions to invalidate a requirement imposed prior to
the corporation's admission. In Insurance Company v. Morse,6 a foreign corporton seeking admission into a state to do local business was compelled before entry
to file an "agreement" foregoing its rights to sue in or remove suits to the federal
courts. Later the corporation in violation of the "agreement", removed a cas4 to
the federal courts. The Supreme Court held that the state statute requiring a filing
358 S. Ct. 75, 80 (1937).

4Id. at 77.

The Court appears at first not to hold flatly that the doctrine of unconstitu-

tional conditions applies only to conditions imposed after admission of the corporation, for
Justice Brandeis adds, "But it may be assumed that the rule (i. e. the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions) . . . is applicable also to conditions to be performed wholly before admis-

sion; . . . . For we are of the opinion that in refusing to grant the authority to carry on local
business except upon payment of the $5000, no constitutional right of the company was violated."
Id. At this point, the Court seems to put the decision on the ground that the condition is
reasonable no matter when imposed. However, when faced with Cudahy Packing Company v.
Hinkle and the other cases referred to in note 2, the court was obliged to rely squarely on the
distinction between conditions imposed before and conditions imposed after admission.
5272 U. S. 494 (1926).
620 Wall. 445 (1874).
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of said "agreement" was unconstitutional as an unreasonable condition.'
It is perhaps highly significant that in Cudahy Packing Company v. Hinkle,8
which held the use of authorized capital stock improper as a tax measure, Justice
Brandeis dissented, although the tax there involved was imposed subsequent to
the corporation's admission. In a word, it appears that Justice Brandeis finds no
valid objection to the use of authorized capital stock as a tax measure, whether
the fee be exacted prior or subsequent to admission. Atlantic Refining Company
v. Virginia is simply an initial step inaugurating a swing to the position taken by
Justice Brandeis as a dissenter in the Hinkle case. I say "inaugurating" because
as will be indicated presently there are definite possibilities for extending

Atlantic Refining Company v, Virginia.
It is needless to point out that there is nothing in the Constitution itself
which suggests that an entrance fee may be measured by authorized capital stock,
whereas a tax subsequently imposed' may not be thus measured. It is submitted
that the only practical reason justifying a distinction between conditions prior and
conditions subsequent to admission, is that it may be unfair, after a corporation
has been admitted, and after it has changed its position by making substantial
investments and expenditures, to impose upon it conditions which the court deems
unreasonable. Where burdensome regulations are imposed as a condition precedent to entry, the corporation has the option, at least, of staying out of the state
and avoiding the burdens sought to be imposed. To date, however, the Court,
when it has declared any regulation invalid under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, does not appear to have examined the particular corporation in any
given case to see whether the regulations, though subsequent, were unreasonable
in the light of the amount of the particular company's investments and expenditures in the state. There has been no attempt to determine the extent of the
company's change of position and the hardship that might ensue in view of that
change. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions appears to have been applied
to invalidate regulations as being unreasonable per se, regardless of the extent of
the particular corporation's change of position.
If, as the writer suggests, the only justification for a distinction between
conditions imposed prior to admission and conditions imposed subsequently lies
in the possibility of hardship where the regulations are subsequent, why may not
the court, disposed to unshackle the state's taxing power, uphold a regulation
7

1owever, it should be noted that while the court in the Morse case treated the theory of
unconstitutional conditions as applicable to regulations imposed prior to entry, the result might
have been reached on other grounds without the necessity of resorting to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. It has been suggested that such an agreement even as between private individuals might be deemed void as against public, policy for, attempting to oust competent jurisdiction of the federal courts. While thus distinguishable, the fact remains that the Court in the Morse
case did invoke the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, whether necessary to the decision
or not.
8278 U. S. 460 (1929).
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such as that involved in Atlantic Refining Company v. Virginia, even if imposed
after the entry of the corporation, if the particular corporation cannot show such a
change of position as to make the imposition of the given subsequent regulations inequitably and unreasonably burdensome? Even though entry of the corporation was
unconditional, if the subsequent regulations are imposed sufficiently promptly, before the corporation has commenced extensive operations, why should such regulation be declared unlawful merely because imposed subsequent to the corporation's
admission?
In short, a court reluctant to sustain barriers to the states' taxing power,
following Atlantic Refining Company v. Virginia, may declare that a state may
impose upon a foreign corporation any tax however measured, not only as a condition precedent to entry, but even after entry, if the corporation's change of position in reliance upon its former admission, weighed against the burdensomeness
of the tax is not sufficient to establish hardship upon the corporation. Such a
development of the Atlantic Refining Company case, it is submitted, is logical,
proper and likely.
Apart from the inroads being made upon cases like Cudahy Packing Company v.Hinkle, by this decision, and its effect in extending the states' power of
taxation, the suggestion of Justice Brandeis that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions is applicable only to regulations imposed after admission of a foreign
corporation, does much to clarify what was formerly an obscure and seemingly
inconsistent position of the Court.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has adhered to the view that any state
might exclude at will any foreign corporation seeking to enter the state to conduct
local business.9 This doctrine has been consistently reiterated by the court even in
decisions recognizing the newer doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Thus in
United States v. Chicago M. & St. P. Railway Company'0 Justice Sutherland
said:
"It has long been settled in this Court that the rejection of an unconstitutional condition imposed by a state upon the grant of a privilege,
even though the state possess the unqualified power to withhold the
grant altogether, does not annul the grant. The grantee may ignore
or enjoin the enforcement of the condition without thereby losing
the grant.""
And Justice Holmes similarly remarked in another case:12
1.
*
' *we
.
assume in favor of the defendants that the state
has the power and constitutional right arbitrarily to exclude the plain9

Maine v. Grand Trunk Railroad, 142 U. S. 217, (1891); Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 282 U. S. 440, (1931).
10282 U. S. 311, 328 (1931).
1lltalics ours.
12Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426, 434 (1926).
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tiff without other reason than such is its will. But it has been held
a great many times that the most absolute seeming rights are qualified, and in some circumstances become wrongs. One of the most
frequently recurring instances is where the so-called right is used
as part of a scheme to accomplish a forbidden result."
There having been no definite suggestion prior to Atlantic Refining Company
v. Virginia that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was restricted in its
operation to regulations imposed subsequent to a corporation's entry, to many, if
not all writers on the subject, such language as that here quoted appeared as an
attempt to compromise two entirely inconsistent theories. With reasonable perplexity, it was asked in effect, how can a state be under A disability to impose
unconstitutional conditions upon a foreign corporation, and yet be able to exclude
that foreign corporation at will?
Some writers concluded that in fact the state did not have power to exclude
at will under all circumstances. I s Most writers took the position that the "literal
implication of the cases is that although a state may not exclude for a bad reason,
it may fantastically enough, do so for no reason at all."' 14 Such conclusions are
reasonable enough, if the premise be accepted that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions applies to any unreasonable regulation, before or after the corporation's entry.
But Justice Brandeis, in restricting the operation of the doctrine to conditions imposed after entry only, dispels the notion that the Court had attempted a
hybrid wedding of two inconsistent theories, and crystallizes the Court's position.
It is perfectly consistent to say on one hand, as he does, that a state may absolutely withhold its permission that a foreign corporation enter, or attach any
condition whatsoever to a grant of consent, and still say on the other hand, that
after a corporation has been permitted to enter, such regulations must meet the
test of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
The decision in Atlantic Refining Company v. Virginia serves moreover to
simplify the legal process by which the legality of entrance fees imposed upon
corporations is determined. Heretofore, a dual problem was involved. First a
proper subject for taxation, must be found; then the measure of the tax must be
scrutinized. The effect of this recent decision is to limit the legal question to the
first consideration only, namely as to whether there is a taxable subject matter.
So long as the fee is exacted for the privilege of entry, it would seem that the
measure of the tax is no longer significant here no matter how unreasonable, and
13Hale in his article "Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights," 35 Col. L.R.
.
that in the circum321, 357 (1935) asks: "Would it not be more accurate to say .....
stances it had no power to exclude . . . . the foreign corporation from the state?" Suggesting that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions results in the abandonment of the traditional doctrine that a foreign corporation may be excluded at will, see Henderson, THE POSITION
OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918) at page 147.
14The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 79 U. of P. L. R. 1118, 1128 (1931) ; and
see Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. of P. L. R. 879, 883, 884 (1929).
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no matter how dinctly it may seem to affect property of the company situated
outside of the state. This seems a permissible consequence of the rule that the
state may attach any condition to th4 privilege to enter. The Court's effort to
show that authorized capital stock has no relation to the company's property,
therefore seems redundant. Indeed the Court itself said, "If Virginia had the
power to charge $5000 for the privilege, the particular measure applied by the
legislature in arriving at that sum would seem to be legally immaterial." 16
One thing is certain. The decision represents a vigorous effort to minimize
the extent of tax immunities. The same determination is evidenced by the majority opinion in another highly significant decision of the Supreme Court handed
down at the pr'esent term of court. In James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 6 it
was held that contractors may be required by a state to pay an income tax measured
by gross receipts, including money received from the federal government for contracting work done for it.

The contractor sought to deduct the ,money received from the federal government from the total taxable income, on the principle that a ,state tax thereon
would constitute interference with a governmental activity of the United States.
The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, held that the contractor was not entitled
17
to any such exemption.
In upholding the state's power to tax the majority was faced with considerable prior authority which seemingly had denied such power. Foremost, among
the cases relied upon by the minority, were PanhandleOil Company v. Mississippi18
and Indian Motorcycle Company v. United States.1 9 In the former it was held

that a state may not impose a sales tax against a vendor of gasoline sold to
the United States. In the latter a sales tax imposed by the federal government
against a vendor of motorcycles sold to a local police force was held invalid.
James v. Dravo Contraoting Company differed from these earlier cases only in that

these involved a sales tax as to goods sold to the government whereas the
James case involved a gross receipts tax as to income for goods and services furnished the government.
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority in upholding the tax contented himself with the assertion that decisions like the Panhandle Oil Company
2O
case are distinguishable and "must be deemed limited to their particular facts."

His attempts to distinguish the case at bar, however, are not very persuasive.
Oddly enough, the Solicitor General of the United States, who filed a brief
as amicus curiae and who sought to have the state tax upheld, disclaiming any
burden upon the federal government from this state tax, conceded that cases like
PanhandleOil Company v. Mississippi are indistinguishable in principle from thc
1658
1658

S. Ct. 75, 77 (1937).
S. Ct. 208 (1937).

l7Roberts, Butler, Sutherland and McReynolds dissented, 58 S. Ct. 208, 221 (1937).
18277 U. S. 218

19283 U. S. 570

(1928).

(1931).

2058 S. Ct. 208, 217

(1937).
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James case and conceded that to uphold the tax in the latter case the former de-

cisions would necessarily require overruling.
It is perhaps unfortunate that courts are loath to admit inconsistency. The
deliberate overruling of prior cases, but with an arbitraiy insistence that nonexistent distinctions operate to preserve the earlier authorities, may have facesaving value. It does, however, make for uncertainty, obscurity, and folklore because it seeks to conceal the vital fact that there has been a basic change of judicial
attitude. A frank admission by the courts of inconsistency with former decisions
is, in the long run, less likely to evoke criticism and less likely to prejudice the
courts' prestige than a thin policy of artificially seeking to preserve a thin coat of
consistency.
The actual result of the James case is not unsound. It might better have
been reached, however, on the reasoning of the Solicitor General. The latter's
argument after admitting the necessity of overruling prior cases, took the broad
ground that no state tax should be invalidated unless it discriminates against the
20
federal government in favor of other taxpayers. A
To this argument, the minority speaking through Justice Roberts replied
that the non-discriminatory nature of a tax, as applied to a federal instrumentality will not save it because:
. .
the doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation
is based upon the right of the federal government to carry on its
lawful operations free from burden or impediment . . . there is
implied from the federal power . . .
an immunity from inter21
ference or burden by the states."

The difficulty with the minority view seems to be in regarding a non-discriminatory tax as necessarily a burden. What is overlooked is the fact that the
term burden suggests a relative concept. One is burdened if required to carry
more than his fellows, but one does not deem himself "burdened" merely because
he is wearing shoes or socks. Assuming what is not necessarily true, that the contractor passed the amount of the taxes exacted over to the federal government by
increasingthe gross receipts of the construction work, the ultimate result of grant-

ing the taxpayer an immunity against the imposition of the state tax is not to prevent the infliction of a burden upon the federal government. On the contrary, it
would merely place the government in a preferred position over private individuals
who require the services of the contractor, for as to money received from these for
20aAs this issue goes to press, Solicitor General Reed has been nominated for the post in :he
Supreme Court left vacant by the retirement of Justice Sutherland. With the appointment of Mr.
Reed to the Supreme Court, the remarks and views expressed in his brief as amicus curial take on
added significance. Who knows but that under his influence the court may eventually adopt his
test of discrimination vel non as determinative of the validity of taxes affecting governmental
instrumentalities. As for the Dravo Contracting Company case, Mr. Reed's elevation to the Supreme
Court operates virtually to make a 6-3 decision of it.
211d. at page 231, 232. Italics ours.
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services, the validity of the income tax is unassailable. It may be quite proper to
find in the Constitution, implied prohibitions against the states' power to burden
the federal government. It is an altogether different matter to construe a prohibition against burdens as a command to give preferences.
Of course, the Panhandle Oil case and like decisions, have thus broadly
construed the word burden, all because of the unnecessarily broad dictum of Marshall that the power to tax is the power to destroy. As stated, such decisions are
necessarily in the way of the holding of the James case and must be overruled
whether expressly or impliedly in order to permit a continuance of the judicial
policy evident in the James case.
One other recent tax decision invites attention. In Puget Sound Stevedoring
22
Company v. Tax Commission of Washington, the Court upheld a state tax imposed for the privilege of conducting a stevedoring business, measured by a certain
percentage of gross receipts. The particular company involved in the case, derived its income from a mixed interstate and local business. Upon a finding that
the tax was solely for the privilege of doing local business, the tax was upheld.
Not one word was said as to the validity of the measure of the tax, namely,
gross receipts. If such gross receipts included receipts from interstate as well as
local commerce it would seem that the measure of the tax would render its exaction unlawful, under a long line of cases.23 Curiously enough, in James v. Dravo
26
24
Contracting Company, previously discussed, both the majority and minority
opinions, by dicta recognized this line of cases as subsisting law. Yet, not one
dissent or objection was heard in the Puget Sound Stevedoring Company case as
to the propriety of the measure of the tax. Query, whether this case should be
viewed as overruling their earlier decisions?
Taken together, these cases, Atlantic Refining Company v. Virginia, James
v. Dravo Contracting Company, and Puget Sound Stevedoring Company v. Tax
Commission of Washington show a definite attitude at least on the part of the
majority of the Supreme Court as nov constituted, against the policy of encumbering the taxing power through immunities or exemptions. That new barriers to
the taxing power will not be recognized, and that doubtful cases will be resolved
in favor of the taxing power seems probable. How far past authority will be overthrown in the attempt to rehabilitate the taxing power admits of no positive
answer. That there has been some retracing of its steps by the court in these
recent cases is difficult to deny. Only the future and the Court itself holds the
answer as to how far existing tax immunities will survive.
Carlisle, Pa.

D. J. FARAGE.

Ct. 72 (1937).
SGalveston etc. Railroad Company v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, (1908); Oklahoma v. Wells
Fargo and Company, 223 U. S. 299 (1912); and see cases cited in James v. Dravo Contracting
58 S. Ct. 208, 220 (1937).
Company,
24
james v. Dravo Contracting Company, 58 S. Ct., 208, 220 (1937).
251d. at page 232.
2258 S.
2

